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Among the new objects of interest emerged from the study of science in action, an important one is what has been categorised under the heading of the “tacit”: tacit knowledge, the tacit dimension of scientific practices. Harry Collins, in particular, insisted that irreducibly tacit presuppositions and corporal skills are inevitably involved in experimental practices, and that these tacit resources play an essential role in the stabilization of scientific achievements.
The aim of this talk is to discuss some epistemological implications of what I will call ‘the opacity of experimental practices’, especially with respect to the principle of experimenters substitutability which is commonly viewed as a necessary feature of any good science.

The Opacity of Experimental Practices
I will begin by explaining in what sense we can say that experimental practices are opaque.
Let us consider the case of an experimenter (let us say S, as Source) who is convinced to master a certain experiment, that is, who knows what to do in his laboratory in order to obtain and re-obtain some given physical effects (let us say the experimental fact F).
If S tries to express what he knows to do, he will be confronted with insurmountable limitations.
First because there can always be some initial conditions that intervene in fact, but that remain tacit for not being recognized as relevant by S;
Second and most of all, because among the initial conditions that are deemed relevant, there are some that resist to a full linguistic expression in virtue of their very nature. This is the case, in particular, for the manipulatory skills and other corporal know-how, such as, for instance, the abilities associated with a clause of the kind: “just the right degree of greasing” of a fiber. S knows how to do, but he does not manage to make fully explicit what he does, to convey with words all what is involved. He has the impression that there is a loss, a residue when he moves away from his successful actions towards the linguistic expression of their success.
This impression is strengthened by the fact that, when S communicates his descriptions to other fellows with the aim of enabling them to master (to reproduce) his own experimental performances, these attempts most of the time fails: no matter how many abundant are the descriptive details, the instructions and advices, his colleagues (let us say R, as Reproducer) most of the time do not succeed (or, at any rate, not immediately) in obtaining the fact F.
With respect to this set of phenomena, we can say that experimental practices are opaque with respect to description.

Correlatively, if S undertakes a process of auto-justification of his own experimental practice (a situation which is seldom realized in practice but is instructive to discuss from a philosophical point of view), S will again encounter insurmountable limitations.
Let us suppose, for instance, that S asks himself why he considers these two experimental sequences, performed at two different moments by varying such and such physical parameter, as one and unique experiment. Or else, let us suppose that S asks himself why at a certain moment of the experimental sequence he has stopped doing new reproductions and variations and has drown from this sequence a determined conclusion (for ex: the fact F is experimentally established).
Faced with these kinds of questions concerning the individuation of experiments and the quantity of time-efforts sufficient to conclude, S will give reasons that explicitly mention him as an individual distinct from others and refer to a mysterious intuition, a scientific ‘sense’ or ‘instinct’ legitimated by his previous experience but which cannot be further analyzed by linguistic means.
With respect such limitations of the auto-justification process, we can say that experimental practices are opaque with respect to justification.

To recap briefly: the experimenter expert of a certain experiment can neither express verbally all the physical and manipulatory conditions of the experimental success he claims to have achieved, nor produce an explicit justification, deprived of any reference to his own personal unanalyzable intuition, of his actions, options and conclusions. 

Consequences of the Opacity in the Stabilized Configurations
Let us now discuss the implications of this opacity with respect to the spread at a larger scale of an experimental practice that has been developed locally by an S.
Two configurations will be distinguished: the stabilized and the non-stabilized experimental practices.
The stabilized configuration will be defined by the absence of controversy: no conflict between specialists; no contestation of the achievements of the experiments; no contestation of the experimenters as experts of this experiment.
In such a configuration, as what the pioneer experimenter S claim to have accomplished locally isn’t brought into question, the spread of his practices will be seen as a transfer or a transmission: as an attempt to transfer the experimental accomplishments to still unskilled apprentices R.
The descriptive opacity will be viewed as a source of retardation or even of failure at the level of the transmission of experimental accomplishments, for everything S can tell to another experimenter about his practices does not suffice to grasp what is actually involved.
In order to overcome these hindrances, the only remaining solution, if R and S are contemporary, is R’s immersion into S’s practices and apprenticeship by direct contact: R visits S, spends time in S’s laboratory, watches S’s way of doing, uses direct pointing and ostension…
These visits cannot completely eliminate the descriptive opacity, but:
(a) They reduce it, in the sense that some factors that weren’t at the beginning recognized to be relevant, are identified and verbalized;
(b) And they make possible to side-step the opacity, in the sense that even without verbalization, R, by repeatedly observing S’s actions, often becomes in turn capable of succeeding. The common interpretation of this success is that R has acquired S’s ‘tacit knowledge’ (skills manipulatory know-how, presuppositions…), although the corresponding resources remained tacit all along the transmission process.
This being said, if immersion can ease the transfer, it is no guarantee of success. If, in spite of direct contact with the experimental practices of S, R continues to fail to obtain F, the common explanation, in the stabilized configuration, is that R hasn’t managed to acquire the tacit knowledge possessed by S… Maybe R is bad at hand-eye coordination? Whatever the details of the explanation, the charge of the failure is turned against R (=against specific features which distinguish the individual R from the individual S: lack of talent…).
In the version of this scenario in which S and R are not contemporary, and in which R tries to replicate a past experiment on the basis of the writings left by a scientist of the past, the old procedural accomplishments can be lost once and for all.
This highlights that experimental accomplishments are not ‘auto-subsistent’, and that the conservation of experimental achievements requires the realization of conditions that are much more complex, constraining and costly than the conservation of written protocols and public reports.
Indeed it requires:
-Either to ensure an uninterrupted transmission of the specific human know-how from experts to apprentices;
-Or to develop mechanical or ‘turnkey’ methods.
Without such costly actions of maintenance the procedural experimental achievements P of an epoch can be lost. A proposition F that have acquired the status of fact in the past on the basis of the experimental practice P, can become, in the present, ‘fossilized’, in the sense that it is a belief, presented in textbooks as a fact, but deprived in the present of any living or even reactivable experimental practice able to produce it.

Such possibilities of diachronic loss at the level of the procedural experimental achievements, or of failure of transfer in the contemporaneous version of the scenario, appear quite harmless, from an epistemological point of view, as long as we reason about the stabilized configuration.
This is because in such a configuration, the experimental outcome of the experimental procedure P is not questioned in its status of genuine fact. Under the presupposition that a fact F has once been experimentally established, the posterior difficulties to spread P, or even the irreversible lost of P, do not seem so important, as far as F is not lost.
But things appear differently when we reason about the non-stabilized configurations.

Consequences of the Opacity in the Non-Stabilized Configurations
Within these configurations, nothing is settled at the beginning. Scientists try to answer a question by means of experiments, but: (a) the answer is not yet determined (let us say, to simplify, either F or non F); (b) nor are determined the experimental procedures that may yield the answer.
Let us suppose that at a given moment a pioneer experimenter S claims to have experimentally established F, and that a colleague is willing to test this claim by attempting to reproduce the original experiment. This will be seen as natural and even required, as an application of the customary idea that sound scientific method demands multiple reproductions by different experimenters.
In such a non-stabilized configuration, what happens in case R fails to obtain F?
There are several possibilities. In Collins’ terms: “R has to choose whether to give up on that type of work, do more experiments, try to learn more by arranging visits, or announce publicly that the original result cannot be confirmed.” (Tacit Knowledge, Trust and the Q of Sapphire, Social Studies of Science, 31/1, 2001, 74).
There are, at bottom, two possibilities:
1/ R can attribute the responsibility of the failure to himself and his own experimental practices.
As in the case of a stabilized configuration, R concludes: ‘I haven’t managed to acquire the skills of S; I have failed to realize the initial conditions that correspond to S’s procedure’.
2/ R can also settle for a second option, which is ruled out as implausible in the stabilized configuration: R can turn the charge against S.
R concludes: “S hasn’t really done what he claims to have done. It is something else that really takes place in S’s experimental practices; The proposition F can’t be taken to pick out an experimental fact”. In that case, R disqualifies S as a true expert of this experiment.
Suppose that R endorse this last option.
Of course, S can as well re-turn the charge against R, maintaining that it is the alleged ‘reproducer’ R who does not really master the details of the experimental procedure, and, most of all, the specific know-how necessary to the actual realization of the set of initial conditions needed to achieve the result F. Here, in a symmetrical manner, S disqualifies R as a true expert of this experiment.

In such a controversial, non-stabilized configuration, it is no longer legitimate to describe the situation, as we did in the case of stabilized configurations, in terms of hindrances to the transmission of experimental achievements. Indeed, in a disputed, non-stabilized configuration, the problem is, precisely, to decide what the achievements are: what the achievements are in terms of experimental results (either F or non F), and correlatively, what the achievements are in terms of experimental protocols.
Two incompatible accounts are associated to the experimental practices under scrutiny. And because the situated, actually performed experimental sequences are descriptively opaque, neither S, nor R, nor anybody else, can exhibit a shared, public object (for instance a text) purporting to fully express ‘the way of working in the laboratory L’, in such a way that the different elements of this ‘way of working’ could be examined closely one by one ‘from the outside’ by all the scientists involved in the controversy (let us call this group of scientists, following Collins, “the core-set”).
Moreover, even if this were possible and if everybody agreed about a given description of a particular ‘way of working’, there would still remain the problem of the opacity with respect to justification. If the ‘scientific intuitions’ of S, R or any other scientist of the core-set part company at the level of, say, the legitimacy of the identification of two partially different procedures as the same experiment, how can the matter be settled? 

If the non-stabilized situations always developped towards an agreement among the scientists of the core-set, the opacity could perhaps be viewed as epistemologically harmless. But this is not the case. 
Indeed, in the actual history of science, what sometimes happens is the following situation: an experimental report becomes predominant and states ‘what has been experimentally established’ (say F); F is presented as an experimental fact in the official publications and text-books, and it is used without further exam as such by a huge number of other scientists that are external to the “core-set”; while some practitioners that indeed belong to the core-set do not subscribe to this report and continue to consider that what has been experimentally established is something else (say non F).
In this case, it becomes clear that what is stabilized at the end of an experimental controversy is not independent from the identity of the different experimenters involved in the dynamical process of stabilization. Indeed, the factual and protocolar achievements are actually attached to the proper name of some particular scientists.
More precisely, when the stabilization occurs, three poles are jointly co-stabilized (i.e., three poles mutually define and support one another): 
–	The experts (=who are the individuals of the dissenting core-set who are deemed to master the practices and to have the right discourse about them?): either S or R;
–	The proper experimental protocols (=what are the experimental procedures which correctly identify the initial conditions?): either ‘what is done in S’s laboratory’, or ‘what is done in R’s laboratory’;
–	The experimental facts (either F or non F).
The genuine experimental facts are those that are obtained under the initial conditions actually involved in the experimental practices mastered by the acknowledged experts.
Thus, admitting a stabilized couple ‘experimental protocol-experimental fact’ means to establish a hierarchy among the individuals belonging to the core-set: it means to acknowledge some of them as legitimate authorities, and to judge others as illegitimate (with respect to the experimental issue under scrutiny, of course; not necessarily in general as competent scientists). 
Now, due to the opacity of experimental practices, this hierarchical judgement about the particular individuals that, historically, have performed the experimental practices under discussion, can hardly be considered to be based solely on the analysis of an object of the kind ‘way in which this individual experimenter (S or R) actually works in his laboratory’.
In practice, what will this judgement based on?
	On the descriptions of S and R about their practices – which are unable to grasp completely what is actually done.
	Maybe moreover on some visits and direct observations.
These can allow a more substantiated judgement about the object ‘way in which this individual experimenter S or R actually works in his laboratory’.
Yet, this object will never become transparent, and most of all, the immersion into somebody else’s practices is a strategy that is seldom implemented thoroughly in the actual history of science, notably because it demands a lot of time, money and energy. Some mutual relatively short visits sometimes occur, yet only rarely do all scientists of the core-set spend long periods of time in the relevant laboratories in order to observe directly the different experimental practices under discussion.
Thus, the judgement of each member of the core-set about the quality of the experimental work of his colleagues will be almost inevitably based also on other elements which are external to the actual ways of carrying out the experiments in question. For instance:
	The past reputation of the individual (which is clearly related to his past scientific accomplishments but not reducible to them);
	Some specific traits of the individual character (sociable and challenging personality versus reserved and shy personality; more or less great rhetorical and pedagogical talents…).
	Not to mention some biographic circumstances (for instance the fact of being a Russian experimenter during the cold war).
Factors of this kind are subjective in the sense of ‘potentially variable from an individual experimenter to another’.
Now, such individually variable factors will be constitutive of the degree of mutual trust of the members of the core-set. And this degree of trust will influence, at each moment of the debate, the decisions and positions of them all.
For instance, the confidence of R in S will influence from the outset his decision about whether to undertake a reproduction of the experiment of S; and, if he undertakes the reproduction, it will influence: the period of time during which, in case of failure, R will keep trying; R’s judgements on the necessity to visit S; the period of time after which R will end up blaming S for failure on the replication of the experiment…
Through these mutual ‘degrees of trust’ of the members of the core-set, some individually variable features seem to intervene as inevitable variables of the stabilization process.
It must be added that the individuals actively involved in the discussion are in general in small number (in such a way that it is difficult to invoke a kind of law of the great numbers that could rule out on average the historically contingent individual differences).
The fact that the core-sets are small is a consequence of the extreme fragmentation of the expertise. Such fragmentation is related to notably due to constraints such as the fact that it takes a very long time to acquire highly specialized and complex know-how; or to the fact that the order of acquisitions is not indifferent (for ex. prior acquisitions of habits may hinder the subsequent acquisition of others...). Since these constraints are inescapable for human beings, the fragmentation of the expertise is, in fact, unavoidable with respect to the development of a science as complex as ours.

Conclusion
When we follow the thread of history from non-stabilized configurations until the emergence of a stabilized configuration: 
	A small number of individuals debate over controversial experimental practices on the basis of largely opaque elements;
	The individual options and positions at each point of the stabilization process depend on a degree of trust in the others, and this degree of trust is in turn influenced by individually variable features that could have been different;
	Moreover, it happens that some scientists of this small core-set of individuals in interaction never subscribe to the stabilized configurations that, historically, prevail.
We begin inclined to suspect that other personalities enjoying different degrees of trust among the colleagues could have fostered a different stabilized configuration; That the identity of the experimenters involved – in the sense of individually variable features that characterize the singular experimenters historically involved – is not indifferent for the identity of what emerges as a stabilized configuration.
This suspicion does not entail the denial of the robustness of the emerging stabilized configurations and the robustness of the subsequent science that is built taking them for granted. But it suggests the possibility and legitimacy of several robust stabilizations, possibly incompatible in terms of experimental facts.

This suspicion goes against the common assumption that the substitutability of the experimenters holds for our science.
In what sense is the experimenters substitutability assumed to hold? Admittedly, the experimenters are not substitutable In fact, because of the unavoidable fragmentation of the expertise. But they are nevertheless commonly thought to be substitutable in principle, which means that all the individuals who are (or could become) true experts are equivalent (indifferent, interchangeable) with respect to experimental achievements.
Yet, a reflection on the opacity of experimental practices suggests that the move from the factual impossibility of the substitution to the in principle validity of the substitutability, is highly problematic.
This is because the demarcation between true experts and the others is itself highly problematic: it is not given ‘in the absolute’ it is not decided ‘once for all’ before the beginning of the discussion about a new delicate experiment. It is part of the discussion, and it is not independent from the demarcation between genuine and illusory experimental achievements. The two demarcations are historically co-stabilized through a process in which individually variable differences between the scientists historically involved seem to matter.

So at the end of the day, the question is: If the core-set individuals had historically been different, would the same stabilized experimental achievements have emerged?
It is only if we give a positive answer to this question, that the factual impossibility of the substitutability of experimenters is harmless from an epistemological point of view.
If, instead, we are ready to take seriously a negative answer, then we face the possibility of a science that would be as robust as ours, but radically different from ours and possibly incompatible with respect to some experimental facts.
The epistemological issue is, therefore, contingentism.


Thus, on the whole: in the non-stabilized configurations:
a small number of individuals debate over controversial experimental practices on the basis of largely opaque elements;
the individual options and positions at each point of the stabilization process depend on a degree of trust in the others,
and this degree of trust is in turn influenced by individually variable features that could have been different;
moreover, it happens that some scientists of this small core-set of individuals never subscribe to the stabilized configurations that, historically, prevail.
All this being admitted, it becomes plausible that other personalities enjoying different degrees of trust among the colleagues could have fostered a different stabilized configuration.
This conclusion does not entail the denial of the robustness of the emerging stabilized configurations and the robustness of the subsequent science that is built taking them for granted.
However, it suggests the possibility and legitimacy of several robust stabilisations, possibly incompatible in terms of experimental facts.

Conclusion:
When follow the thread of history from a non-stabilized configuration until the emergence of a stabilized configuration, we become inclined to suspect that the singular identity of the experimenters involved – in the sense of individually variable features that characterize the singular experimenters historically involved – is not indifferent for the identity of what emerges as a stabilized configuration, and, therefore, of what is taken to be an experimental fact.

This suspicion goes against the common assumption that the substitutability of the experimenters holds for our science.
In what sense is the experimenters substitutability assumed to hold?
Admittedly, the experimenters are not substitutable In fact, because of the unavoidable fragmentation of the expertise.
But they are nevertheless commonly thought to be substitutable in principle, which means that all the individuals who are (or could become) true experts are equivalent (indifferent, interchangeable) with respect to experimental achievements.



